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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Anthony Kyle Blaine Smith appeals from the district court's order affirming the
magistrate court's order denying his suppression motion.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The district court adopted the following factual background, found by the
magistrate court and largely undisputed, for this case:
On December 10, 2013, Boise City Police Officers responded to a report
of a runaway at a shed located on the property of a Boise residence. The
dispatch information regarding the report related that a 20 year old male
(Smith) lived in the shed on the property and was harboring a 15 year old
runaway with whom Smith had a valid No Contact Order. Officers
contacted Smith at the residence/shed (hereinafter shed) and Smith
allowed them access to the shed; however the Officers did not find the
juvenile runaway.
Later that day, Officers received a second report from dispatch that a
juvenile probation officer provided information that the female juvenile was
at the shed and that Smith may have hidden her in a hole beneath the
floorboards. Upon the officers['] return to the property, they heard a
"commotion inside (the shed) as if furniture was being moved." The
officers announced and, after a "minute" delay, Smith opened the door of
the shed and exited. When confronted with the information regarding the
juvenile's presence on the property, Smith stated to the officers "Yeah,
she's here." After some discussion related to pulling up the floorboards of
the shed that concealed the hole, officers entered the shed, secured the
juvenile, and arrested Smith. Officers did not have a warrant permitting
them to enter the shed. During a search of Smith incident to his arrest,
officers located what was ultimately determined to be Marijuana, a
Schedule I Controlled Substance.
(R., pp.146-47 (brackets original) (punctuation standardized).)
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The state charged Smith with violation of a no-contact order, harboring a
runaway, and possession of marijuana. (R., pp.7-9.) Smith filed a motion to suppress
the evidence, arguing that the warrantless search of his shed was unlawful. (R., pp.3637, 42-47, 60-66.)

The magistrate court denied Smith's suppression motion.

(R.,

pp.79-84.) Smith thereafter entered a conditional guilty plea to the charges, reserving
the right to appeal from the magistrate court's order denying his suppression motion.
(R., p.86.) The magistrate court entered judgment against Smith and placed him on

probation for a period of two years. (R., p.87.)
Smith appealed to the district court (R., pp.92-94), and the district court affirmed
the order of the magistrate court (R., pp.146-55). Smith filed a timely notice of appeal.
(R., pp.165-66.)
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ISSUE
Smith's statement of the issues on appeal is found at page 4 of his Appellant's
brief and is lengthy. The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Smith failed to show error in the district court's intermediate appellate
decision affirming the magistrate court's order denying his suppression motion?
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ARGUMENT
Smith Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Appellate Decision Affirming
The Magistrate Court's Order Denying His Suppression Motion

A

Introduction
While searching for a 15-year-old runaway girl, with information that she was

being harbored by Smith, a 20-year-old male with a standing no contact order, and was
hidden beneath the floorboards of Smith's shed, officers entered the shed without a
warrant to recover the minor girl. (R., pp.146-47.) Smith challenged the warrantless
entry in a suppression motion filed before the magistrate court. (R., pp.36-37, 42-47,
60-66.) Determining that the warrant exceptions of both exigency and consent justified
the warrantless entry, the magistrate court denied Smith's suppression motion.

(R.,

pp.79-83.) Smith appealed to the district court and the court upheld the magistrate's
order. (R., pp.146-55.)
Arguing that the evidence found on Smith's person during a search incident to his
arrest was fruit of an unlawful entry into his dwelling, Smith contends that the district
court erred by upholding the magistrate court's order denying his suppression motion.
(Appellant's brief, pp.5-8.) Application of the correct legal standards to the facts found
below, however, shows no error in the district court's intermediate appellate decision.
The district court's decision should be affirmed.

B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate appellate

capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's decision." State v.
DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709,711,184 P.3d 215,217 (Ct. App. 2008). The standard of review
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of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is
challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court's findings of fact that are
supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional
principles to those facts. State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 843, 103 P.3d 454, 456 (2004).

C.

The Officers' Warrantless Entry Into Smith's Shed Was Justified Under An
Exception To The Warrant Requirement
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects "[t]he right of

the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. An officer's warrantless
entry into a residence is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within a wellrecognized exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Barrett, 138 Idaho 290, 293,
62 P.3d 214,218 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Pearson-Anderson, 136 Idaho 847,849, 41
P.3d 275, 277 (Ct. App. 2001 ).

The magistrate court correctly determined, and the

district court correctly affirmed, that the warrant exceptions of both exigency and
consent justified the warrantless entry under the totality of the circumstances of this
case.

1.

The Warrant Exception Of Exigency Justified The Officers' Warrantless
Entry Into Smith's Shed

One exception to the warrant requirement occurs when the "exigencies of the
situation" make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search
is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
385, 393-394 (1978).

Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S.

Under this exigent circumstances exception, "a warrantless

intrusion may be justified by hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, or imminent destruction of
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evidence, or the need to prevent a suspect's escape, or the risk of danger to the police
or to other persons inside or outside the dwelling." Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91,
100 (1990) (internal citation and quotation omitted).

A court evaluating a claim that

exigent circumstances justified a warrantless home entry should determine whether the
facts known to the police, and the reasonable inferences drawn from those facts, would
"warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was
appropriate. Pearson-Anderson, 136 Idaho at 850, 41 P.3d at 278.
The reasonableness of the belief that an exigency exists is determined by the
totality of the circumstances known to the police at the time of the entry.

State v.

Campbell, 104 Idaho 705, 711, 662 P.2d 1149, 1155 (Ct. App. 1983). While courts
must scrutinize a claim of emergency to ensure that it is not a mere pretext for entries
and searches that otherwise would require a warrant, courts should avoid secondguessing police decisions made in legitimate belief that life may very well be at stake.
Pearson-Anderson, 136 Idaho at 850, 41 P.3d at 278. "The calculus of reasonableness
must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make splitsecond judgments-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving."
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989). Therefore, reasonableness "must be
judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the
20/20 vision of hindsight."

~

The warrant exception of exigency clearly applies in this case: Smith had hidden
a 15-year-old minor, who had run away from home and with whom Smith had a valid no
contact order, underneath the floorboards of his shed. (R., p.150.) On appeal Smith
disagrees with this assessment, contending that the minor child whom he had hidden
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beneath his floorboards was in no immediate danger. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-7.) But as
noted by the district court, "[n]o child who has run away from her parent's supervision
and who has taken refuge with another juvenile in the latter's home can be considered
'safe;' that such action is fraught with danger is self-evident and requires

no

elaboration." (R., p.150 (quoting In the Interest of Moten, 242 So.2d 849, 856 (La. Ct.
App. 1970)). The risk of danger to the child is objectively greater in such a case as this
where officers had credible information that the runaway minor was at least hidden, if
not trapped, in a hole beneath the floorboards of Smith's shed-especially where Smith
was an adult male with a standing no contact order. (R., p.151, n.4.) The district court
correctly upheld the magistrate's conclusion that the exigency exception to the warrant
requirement applied under the facts of this case.

2.

The Officers' Warrantless Entry Into Smith's Shed Was Also Justified By
Smith's Voluntary Consent

Another clearly recognized exception to the warrant requirement is consent from
an individual who has actual or apparent authority to submit to the search. Schneckloth
v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (citations omitted); State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho
215, 219, 984 P.2d 703, 707 (1999). The voluntariness of an individual's consent is a
question of fact to be determined based upon the totality of the circumstances.
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227.
The voluntary consent exception to the warrant requirement also applies to this
case.

On appeal Smith challenges the district court's upholding of the magistrate's

"conclusion" that Smith voluntarily consented to the police's entry into his shed.
(Appellant's brief, pp.7-8.) But the voluntariness of consent is not a question of law; it is
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a question of fact to be determined by all the surrounding circumstances.

State v.

Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796, 69 P.3d 1052, 1057 (2003). Smith has failed to show that
the magistrate's factual finding that he voluntarily consented is clearly erroneous.
Smith asserts that his consent was coerced by law enforcement making "a clear
threat" that "somebody was going to be bitten by a dog" if they had to call one in.
(Appellant's brief, p.8.) Even assuming, arguendo, that the officers' comments could be
taken as "a clear threat," the district court recognized that this "comment was one of a
number of factors the magistrate could consider on the question of voluntariness." (R.,
p.154.) But it was only one factor.
Additional circumstances properly considered by the magistrate court in this case
included the following facts:
shed earlier in the day.

Smith had granted consent for the officers to search his

(R., p.82.) The officers were unable to locate the runaway

minor during that initial encounter.

(Id.)

However, when they returned, they were

armed with reliable information that Smith was hiding the girl in a hole under the
floorboards of his shed.

(Id.)

They confronted Smith with this information and he

admitted that he was hiding the juvenile.

(R., p.80.) The officers requested Smith's

assistance, asking him to tell her to come out, and Smith said "okay." (R., p.82.) Smith
then explained to the officers how to remove the floorboards to recover the young girl
and helped the officers do it.

(R., pp.82-83.)

The totality of these circumstances

supports the magistrate's finding that Smith voluntarily consented.

The district court

correctly upheld the magistrate's conclusion that the consent exception to the warrant
requirement applied under the facts of this case.
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3.

There Is No Basis To Suppress The Evidence Discovered During The
Search Incident To Smith's Arrest

Finally, Smith argues that the marijuana found during a search of his person
incident to his arrest must be suppressed because, he asserts, the entry into his shed
was unlawful.

(Appellant's brief, p.8.)

Smith's argument fails because, as shown

above, the entry into Smith's shed was supported by both the exigency and consent
exceptions to the warrant requirement. The district court correctly upheld the order of
the magistrate court. The appellate decision of the district court should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
intermediate appellate decision, affirming the magistrate court's order denying Smith's
motion to suppress.
DATED this 3rd day of November, 2015.

C
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